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Why we don’t need an academic 
rebel alliance  
politico.ie 18 May 2011 
As an intellectual, the first duty of the academic who 
wishes to engage with society is on the level of ideas, 
writes Eddie Brennan. Trying to build a new society 
within the institutions, language and politics of the 
nineteenth century is hopeless; what is needed from 
intellectuals and academics is rebellious thought. 
Universities may damage your ability to think. This 
was the thrust of an article in this month’s Le Monde 
Diplomatique where Pierre Rimpert provocatively 
discussed the silence of French intellectuals in recent 
social upheavals. Essentially, Rimpert argues that the 
fact that most of the country’s public intellectuals are 
also university researchers or teachers has effectively 
stifled French intellectual life. 
French academic publishers are cranking out critical 
texts to a thriving market. Yet French academics, 
particularly in the social sciences, are nowhere to be 
seen as critical public intellectuals and, more 
importantly, as allies of workers’ and students’ 
movements. The article begs questions of academia as 
a supposed bastion of critical thinking. It also makes 
uncomfortable reading for us academics. Not only 
may we not be as free in our thinking as we like to 
think, there is also the question of whether we have 
any relevance to society. 
Academics are not intellectuals 
It will come as no surprise to many that holding an 
academic job does not necessarily mean that you are a 
serious thinker. We rarely question how our own 
shortcomings and biases as thinkers, teachers and 
researchers are shaped by the cultures and constraints 
of the institutions we work in. 
Before going any further, a full discussion of the limits 
of academic work needs to take stock of the 
downgrading of academic professionalism, the 
explosion of counter-productive managerialism, the 
softening up of universities for privatisation and so 
on. This, however, is another day’s work. I am 
concerned here with the ways that academia, even on 
its purest terms, can limit critical thought. 
Rimbert writes that today’s revolutionaries need 
thinkers who are free from the ‘norms of academic 
success and disciplinary straitjackets’. So what are the 
limitations of academia? Recognition is probably the 
most potent component of academic success. To be 
known, and to be taken seriously, is something that 
many academics value more than financial reward. 
However, building recognition involves politics as 
much as accomplishment. One must build affiliations 
and connections that are often based on shared 
theoretical viewpoints, research subjects or methods. 
This leads to the clustering of a small number of 
dominant theoretical approaches. Rather than being 
tools of understanding then theoretical positions can 
become blinkers, serving as marks of allegiance. 
Language, another marker of position, is often so 
specialised and obscure that it becomes a barrier to 
translation across disciplines. Ironically, it can bar the 
public from texts that deal with exploitation, power 
and exclusion. However, to write in plain English 
might suggest a lack of sophistication. 
Academic writing often looks like a patchwork quilt of 
other people’s words and ideas. It is difficult to say 
something in an academic text without demonstrating 
that someone else said it before you. This is part of 
academic rigour. It is a mark of respect to thinkers 
who have gone before us and it creates long debates 
through history rather than a cacophony of individual, 
isolated comments. It also makes the creation of new 
thinking torturously slow. 
For Rimpert, academic discipline engenders quietism. 
A doctorate, for example, teaches analysis, a body of 
knowledge and so on. It also teaches ‘propriety and 
precedence’. It ‘encourages a willingness to surrender 
strong opinions’. Importantly, it encourages the ‘view 
that things are “always more complicated” than they 
may actually be’. This leaves little room for rapid, 
passionate and committed critique. Rimpert puts it up 
to academics that while they may be critical in their 
thinking, they also have an apolitical bias built into 
the structure of their work. He says this as if it is a bad 
thing. 
How should academics engage with politics? 
The role of the intellectual is not to be a politician. 
While Rimpert’s discussion is provocative and 
interesting he seems to assume that academics, as 
intellectuals, have a duty to ally themselves with ‘anti-
establishment’ groups. He sees virtue in a ‘rebel 
alliance’ of academics, politicians and activists. I 
disagree. 
Rimpert celebrates the idea of a ‘rebel alliance’. While 
it evokes glamorous visions of May ’68 (or Star Wars) 
it is not the automatic duty of progressive intellectuals 
to form easy alliances with trade union movements or 
activist groups. Behind this there is the danger of 
traditional, aesthetic posturing rather than effective 
contribution or critique. Historically, the lower middle 
classes have tended to build power through apparent 
alliances with society’s underdogs. This is often 
unconsciously instrumental rather than altruistic. 
Academics often speak on behalf of the oppressed at 
conferences that the poor will never attend, and in 
journals that they will never read. Nevertheless, such 
alliances allow academics to feel good about 
themselves while building recognition. 
There is also a danger that by entering existing 
political games one becomes enclosed and limited by 
them, and to them. The divide between ‘left’ and ‘right’ 
provides a perfect example of this type of limitation. 
Pierre Bourdieu, an engaged intellectual feted by 
Rimpert, pointed out that it is only possible to 
advance our conception of the democratic state by 
‘rejecting the usual alternative between liberalism and 
socialism’. It is ‘one of those damaging dualisms that 
impede thought’ (L’Express 18 March 1993). Left/
right offers a choice that is no choice at all. Both are 
materialist positions on how the economy should be 
managed. All other ways of imagining society beyond 
a system of financial exchange are foreclosed. The role 
of the intellectual is not to be ‘left-wing’ as Rimpert 
seems to assume. It is to transcend the assumptions, 
definitions and categories that are handed to us by 
society. 
Losing our haloes 
The role of the intellectual is to offer alternative 
visions of the social world. As Bourdieu saw it the 
engaged intellectual has a duty to train people in 
intellectual self-defence. To give people the tools they 
need to see through everyday misrepresentations of 
themselves and the world. To do this effectively, 
however, intellectuals must be able to see their own 
limitations and mistaken assumptions. Rimpert’s 
article does a service by prompting academics to 
contemplate how their work limits their thinking. 
Academics also need to realise that they provide 
labour to capitalism like any other worker. 
In The Communist Manifesto Marx wrote that the 
‘bourgeoisie has stripped of its halo every activity 
hitherto honored and looked up to in reverent awe. It 
has transformed the doctor, the lawyer, the priest, the 
poet, the man of science into its paid wage labourers’. 
From this, Marshall Berman takes the point that 
‘nobody in bourgeois society can be pure or safe or 
free’. 
Intellectuals must recognise the depths of their own 
dependence—spiritual as well as economic 
dependence—on the bourgeois world they despise. It 
will never be possible to overcome these 
contradictions unless we confront them directly and 
openly (Berman 1988: 119) 
While academics may often that feel that they occupy 
a place somewhere outside the grubby world of 
economics, Marx made it clear that we are only paid 
our salaries because we add to capital. Ideas from 
universities contribute to management, marketing, 
government policy and so on. Journal publishing, for 
example, is a transfer of academic and public 
resources to private capital. Specialised journals cost 
university libraries thousands per annum. Yet the 
internet has reduced distribution costs and content is 
provided for free by academics eager for publication. 
Academic publishers have been making millions from 
user generated content since long before Facebook or 
YouTube were dreamt of. Academics do not need to 
join the workers. They need to realise that they are 
workers. 
So how should academics engage as intellectuals? 
Rimpert points out Bourdieu’s contribution to a rail 
workers’ strike in 1995. An intellectual of Bourdieu’s 
calibre can bring recognition and legitimation to a 
movement. However, we cannot all be Pierre 
Bourdieu, Noam Chomsky or Jurgen Habermas. In 
any case there are media bottlenecks. Only so many 
protests can be recognised and covered. Nevertheless, 
academics as intellectuals can contribute to public 
discussion through the media. 
Like politics, however, the media can enclose thought 
within a limited and limiting game. Contributions 
need to be timely. Opinion pieces need to be ‘hooked’ 
onto ongoing stories. As Rimpert points out 
intellectual contribution is often reduced to a static 
face-off between ‘expertise and counter- expertise’. 
Programmes seek contributions on recognised 
concerns and rarely seek to raise those concerns 
beyond current definitions of politics and the 
economy. Meaningful intellectual media contributions 
should expand or lead, rather than follow, media 
agendas. 
There is also a danger, given the academic thirst for 
recognition, that being a public intellectual will be 
conflated with being a publicised intellectual. We do 
not need media coverage or a political platform to 
engage with the public. It may lack glamour but our 
teaching and research are nevertheless a public 
engagement with our students. We can also quietly 
share our knowledge with communities outside the 
university through further education programmes, 
free public lectures and so on. 
Academics have a duty to contribute their time and 
their intellectual ability to society. Rimbert asks if the 
alliance between ‘ordinary working people and 
academics’ could be reformed. Academics do not need 
to ally themselves with workers’ interests because they 
automatically, but often unknowingly, share them. 
Nevertheless, academics will not necessarily best 
contribute to workers’ struggles, as intellectuals, by 
hoisting placards or chanting slogans. Nor should they 
be easy, unquestioning allies. Given the current 
domination of globalised finance and multinational 
capital, intellectual interventions are as important in 
dispelling the false perceptions of local business 
owners as they are to helping employees. Intellectuals 
should not be ‘right’ or ‘left’ but should aim instead to 
transcend categories that obscure our view of the 
world. 
As intellectuals, academics’ social contribution should 
be on the level of ideas. To make this contribution, we 
must think beyond, and outside of, existing political 
and media games. The changes that are needed in the 
twenty-first century require new ways of imagining 
and describing life, society and governance. We 
cannot build a new social world within the 
institutions, language and politics of the nineteenth 
century. We need intellectual rebels. We do not need a 
‘rebel alliance’. 
